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THE DAMNEDEST TOWN THIS SIDE OF HELL:
TAMPA, 1920-29. (PART II)
By DR. FRANK ALDUINO
duties he warned Tampa’s underworld that
he would vigorously enforce the law.
Stalnaker kept his word. On his first day on
the bench the crusading magistrate quadrupled the customary fines and shocked the
city by imposing stiff prison sentences for
bolita and liquor violators.28
Stalnaker’s aggressive stand against Tampa’s
vice conditions sent many liquor violators
scurrying for safe shelter. In fact, E. L.
Bergstram, a federal prohibition agent in the
city, stated:

Judge Leo Stalnaker, Sr

The exception to this rule occurred in the
summer of 1927 when the City Council
appointed judge Leo Stalnaker to the
municipal bench.27
Stalnaker, a State Representative, who had
recently gained notoriety for sponsoring a
controversial antievolution bill, was selected
as a temporary replacement on the bench in
June 192 7. To retain his judgeship, he
would have to win a special election in
October.
Despite
the
consequences,
Stalmaker, in an act of defiance to the
political establishment, quickly asserted his
independence. Upon assuming his judicial

I know that many "speakeasies" and
other places where liquor has been
sold in the past have closed their
doors and gone out of business. They
are not willing to run the risk of
being "caught with the goods." The
closing of these places is having its
effect on the moonshine stills. Many
of them also are going out of
business because the market for their
liquor has been severely crimped.”29
Although
Judge
Stalnaker's
stern
interpretation of the law delighted the city's
ardent prohibitionists, it infuriated Tampa's
political structure. Not willing to wait until
the upcoming judicial election, Mayor Perry
Wall demanded the immediate removal of
the factious magistrate. Unable to secure the
support of a majority of city commissioners,
Wall had to wait for the October plebiscite.
As expected, Stalnaker lost the judicial contest, carrying only two of twenty-six
precincts. Despite his decisive defeat, the

judge had three more months on the
municipal bench before his abbreviated term
expired. On November 27,1927, using a
movie camera the judge recorded a vice
sweep through Ybor City. The pictures
would be used as evidence for future
arrests.30
The movie, which the judge entitled The
Wages of Sin, provoked the wrath of Mayor
Wall and other city politicians. Once again,
they called for Stalnaker’s impeachment.
Although many Tampans believed that the
judge had usurped the law, he managed to
serve out his entire appointment. For seven
months Tampa’s underworld and its political
allies had faced a formidable foe; illegal
liquor and bolita operators lost a
considerable amount of revenue while
Stalnaker sat on the municipal bench. They
would not soon forget this crusading
magistrate. In fact, within a year of his
defeat, Stalnaker was disbarred from the
Florida Bar Association. Throughout the
Great Depression he was forced to write
detective stories to support his family.31
Stalnaker could not be bribed, but he was
the exception to the rule. Prohibition added
to the public corruption already flourishing
in Tampa. Dishonest officials allegedly
including patrolmen, police chiefs, city
commissioners, and even a few mayors, all
accepted protection money. Yet, municipal
authorities did not have a monopoly on
graft. Throughout the "Noble Experiment,"
Hillsborough County sheriffs were as
bribable as their municipal counterparts. For
example, William Spencer, a county sheriff
during the early days of Prohibition, liked to
personally
collect
his
graft
from
moonshiners so that "he could sample some
of their hooch."32 Another sheriff accused
of accepting gratuitous kickbacks was
Luther Hiers. In September 1926, an
affidavit signed by some of Tampa’s most

prominent citizens accused the sheriff of
allowing at least 101 saloons to operate
within the county. The sworn statement also
alleged that Hiers tolerated the bolita
rackets, prostitution, and dope peddlers.
Although the besieged sheriff was chastized
by the local press, Governor John Martin
refused to remove him.33
L. M. Hatton was not so fortunate. In one of
the closest races in Hillsborough County
history, Hatton defeated three former
sheriffs: L. C. Hiers, William Spencer, and
A. J. White. In office only a few months,
Hatton was accused of receiving $10,000 a
month from the county’s liquor and
gambling violators. According to an
affidavit signed by Deputy John Harrington,
who was Sheriff Hatton’s liaison with
Tampa’s underworld:
When Hatton became sheriff [I] was
authorized by Hatton to make
collections weekly of sums of money
from persons violating the liquor and
gambling laws, the amount of such
collections to be fixed by the
affidavit upon the character of the
business done by such law
violators.34
Harrington claimed that Hatton maintained
two lists of violators-an active and inactive.
Individuals on the active list paid the sheriff
and were allowed to continue their illegal
operations. Those on the inactive list refused
to pay the sheriff and immediately had their
"joints" raided. Upon receiving Deputy
Harrington’s sworn statement and other
damaging testimony, Governor Doyle
Carlton removed the crooked sheriff. His
decision was later upheld by the Legislature.
Although Hatton was replaced, subsequent
Hillsborough County sheriffs continued to
receive graft from the city’s underworld.35

Despite convenient protection arrangements
with county sheriffs and municipal officials,
bootleggers still needed to use discretion
when conducting their business. Most
rumrunners feared the long arm of the
federal government. When the Volstead Act
became effective on January 16, 1920, the
Treasury Department was ordered by
Congress to create an additional branch of
the Internal Revenue Bureau. It was given
the responsibility of enforcing the national
prohibitionary
laws.
This
so-called
Prohibition Unit supervised the actions of
each of the forty-eight state Prohibition
Directors.36
Florida’s first federal prohibition chief was
judge 0. P Hilburn. A Tampa native, World
War I military hero, and former
Hillsborough County Juvenile Court
magistrate, Hilburn was selected by National
Prohibition Director John Kramer to
suppress the state’s liquor traffic. During the
first months of the "Noble Experiment,"
federal authorities made a concerted effort to
eradicate the state’s infant bootleg trade.
Local newspapers praised Judge Hilburn’s
resolve and efficiency. They also wrote
glowing stories about the courageous
exploits of his agents, especially Mayor
Frank Williams, Tampa’s future police chief.
Many Tampans believed H. M. Gaylord,
Deputy Commissioner of the Internal
Revenue, when he stated that the United
States would soon be as "dry as a desert."37
Yet this prevailing sense of optimism soon
evaporated as Florida prohibition agents
became increasingly handicapped by several
obstacles. First of all, throughout the "Noble
Experiment" Congress refused to adequately
finance the war on liquor. Periodically, state
directors, in order to absorb budgetary cuts,
had to release their agents. In May 1921,
Judge Hilburn was compelled to furlough 75
percent of his entire prohibitionary force.

Another agency restricted by tight congressional budgets was the Coast Guard.
This branch of the Treasury Department had
the unenviable task of controlling the
importation of smuggled liquor and other
contraband along Florida’s 1,200 mile
coastline. Severely undermanned and
lacking the necessary appropriations, the
Guard was almost impotent in its struggle
against better financed and more
sophisticated rumrunners. Using high-speed,
expensive motorboats, smugglers easily
out-maneuvered
the
Coast
Guard’s
antiquated cutters.38
A second problem facing federal prohibition
was the lack of honest and efficient agents.
Low pay, long hours, few benefits, and the
lack of job security discouraged qualified
applicants and bred corruption within the
ranks of the Prohibition Unit. Throughout
the "Noble Experiment" scores of federal
agents (especially prior to 1927 when they
were not covered by Civil Service
requirements) were dismissed from the
service for accepting bribes or consorting
with known bootleggers. Tampa newspapers
frequently reported the arrest or dismissal of
dishonest prohibition agents.39
Another obstacle to enforcement of the
Eighteenth
Amendment
was
an
unsympathetic federal judiciary. The
Volstead Act violators filled the courts,
frustrating many already overworked judges.
By 1922, more federal courts were
desperately needed to try the massive
volume of prohibition violators. Yet
Congress never provided adequate funding.
This lack of Congressional support created a
good deal of resentment among members of
the federal bench, which was usually
reflected in prohibition cases. "Damp and
wet" judges, disgruntled with the existing
system, became excessively lenient in their
punishment to liquor violators. Fines,

sometimes as low as five or ten dollars, were
not uncommon for those breaking federal
prohibitionary statutes. judges also showed
their displeasure with the "Noble Experiment" by restricting the scope of evidence
permitted in alcohol prosecutions. Although
the Supreme Court had broadened search
and seizure rules, federal judges were often
hesitant to allow questionable evidence in
the courtroom.40
Because of this judicial hostility, prohibition
agents found it difficult to obtain the
necessary evidence for a solid prosecution.
In order to have a chance for a conviction,
agents needed to arrest a defendant in the act
of selling illegal liquor. In Ybor City, this
was nearly impossible. According to Tampa
historian Anthony Pizzo, every street corner
in the city’s Latin quarter had posted sentries
that watched for federal agents. If one was
spotted, a warning quickly spread
throughout
the
neighborhood
cafes,
restaurants, and speakeasies. Since liquor
was generally served in a pitcher, any
evidence was simply destroyed by pouring it
down a drain. When prohibition agents
arrived at their destination, they usually
found patrons drinking nothing but cafe con
leche.41
Throughout the Prohibition era, federal
enforcement of the Volstead Act can be
characterized as cyclical. In fact, federal
enforcement patterns in Tampa were
remarkably similar to those practiced by
local police and county sheriffs. Federal
agents often conducted their intensive
crusades
against
bootleggers
and
moonshiners just prior to an important
election or after the replacement of a state,
regional, or federal prohibition director.
In Tampa, the appointment of a new federal
prohibition chief usually brought a period of
instability for the city’s bootleggers. When

A. L. Allen was appointed the chief federal
agent in the State of Florida, he promised
“vigorous and unflinching enforcement of
all prohibition laws.”42 Within months he
and his men captured 102 stills, 26,912
quarts of whiskey, and 55,777 gallons of
mash. Yet, this enthusiasm for law and order
quickly waned. After the initial drive,
federal prohibition arrests decreased
considerably. Infrequent raids continued
over the next few years, including several
against the Florida Brewing Company. They
increased again in 192 5 with the arrival in
Tampa of General Lincoln Andrews.
Appointed by President Calvin Coolidge in
April of that year to head the Prohibition
Bureau, Andrews conducted a massive
nationwide campaign against bootleggers,
moonshiners, and international smugglers.
His first target was the leaky State of
Florida.43
In order to control the embarrassing amount
of illicit liquor flowing into the Sunshine
State, Andrews devised a two-pronged plan
to curtail rum-running. His main objective
was to completely reorganize the Prohibition
Bureau. Every prohibition agent was furloughed and thoroughly reviewed before
being allowed to return to work. Many did
not meet the new rigorous requirements and
were dismissed. Assistant Treasury Director
Andrews also replaced or transferred every
state prohibition director in the Union. In
Florida, A. L. Allen was succeeded by
Benjamin Simmons, an exbrigadier general
who supposedly had no political connections
and was given the job solely because of his
superior administrative skills. Simmons was
given a free hand in selecting his agents.44
As his primary assistant, Simmons chose
Phillip
Hambsch,
a
retired
navy
lieutenant-commander who had starred on
the football team at the Naval Academy.

Andrews’ second course of action in his
quest to crush the liquor trade in Tampa and
the rest of Florida involved the Coast Guard.
General Andrews, in order to block the
importation of spirits during the busy tourist
months, transferred the large Rum Fleet
stationed off New York, New Jersey, and
New England to the Sunshine State.
Andrews planned to seal the Florida coast
before northern rumrunners had a chance to
deliver their goods into the state. "When the
rum fleet arrives it will pursue the
rumrunners just as a fishing smack follows a
mackerel,”45 intoned Captain John Berry,
Commander of the Florida Coast Guard. He
continued by warning potential smugglers,
"If this foreign fleet, which has been
laughing at the law in eastern waters,
dares to hoist anchors and head for
Florida, it will be a most dangerous
move it ever made. We are prepared
to meet any of the vessels whose
skippers think they can ignore the
law and reap a harvest in Florida."46
The combined activities of Director
Simmons and Captain Berry had a
tremendous effect on the supply of imported
liquor in Tampa. It was reported that the
“squeeze" doubled the price of scotch
whiskey to nearly $25.00 a quart.
Furthermore, cafes, restaurants, and other
liquor emporiums that formerly did a
thriving business either temporarily closed
their establishments or sold their customers
moonshine. Although this colored "shine"
was barely fit for human consumption, a
thirsty public was willing to pay as much as
$10.00 a quart for the inferior liquid.47
Surprisingly, this effective crusade lasted for
over eight months. With General Andrews
personally directing the operation from
Florida, the federal government maintained
a tough enforcement policy. In fact, in July

1926, Andrews added a new weapon to his
arsenal - airplanes. Docked on Davis Island,
these aircraft were flown by navy and army
pilots. They were equipped with machine
guns to fire upon smugglers who resisted
arrest. Although few of these "Rum Planes"
ever
encountered
bootleggers,
they
nonetheless provided essential intelligence
for federal officials. Flying high above the
earth, they charted and patrolled the
labyrinth of waterways and inlets used as
landing spots by smugglers. Apparently, the
Air Force and other federal agencies
continued to wreak havoc on Tampa's rum
trade throughout the early months of 1926.
Even Izzy Einstein, the legendary
prohibition agent from New York, noticed
Tampa's shortage of quality alcohol. While
visiting his brother in the city Einstein
commented: "Everyone [in Tampa] seems
happy, sober and orderly, and I haven't seen
a single drink since I came. One glass of
buttermilk was the most intoxicating thing I
could get to drink in a couple of restaurants I
tried.”48
Despite an impressive record against the
bootleg trade, the federal crusade suddenly
ended in late 1926. Lack of funds, apathy
and corruption allowed Tampa's rumrunners
to soon reestablish their lucrative businesses.
While intermittent crackdowns on suspected
liquor violators continued throughout the
remaining years of the "Noble Experiment,"
there was not another coordinated effort to
crush the importation of smuggled liquor in
Tampa. The Great Depression and the
Wickersham report which "documented the
breakdown of enforcement and impossibility
of imposing aridity on a determined
minority," assured that the federal
government would do little to dry-up the
city of Tampa, as well as the rest of the
nation.49
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